RESETTLEMENT AND NATION-BUILDING
RESETTLEMENT AND NATION-BUILDING-THE CASE OF
EDCOR MINDANAO
BY FAINA C. ABAYA-ULINDANG,Ph.D
Mindanao State University –Marawi
Marawi City,Philippines
[Paper prepared for the
ICOPHIL9 ,Michigan State University East Lansing,Michigan. Oct.28-30,2012]
Introduction:
Economic Development Corps(EDCOR)
settlements in Mindanao was conceived and planned to answer the growing insurgency in post WorldWar II
Philippines. It was intended to counter
the `land to the landless’ slogan of the Communists that had drawn landless tenants of Central Luzon to
the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB)of the Communists. This resettlement
project puts into canvas a picture of the Philippines as a volatile
predominantly agricultural country and second, a country that is divided
politically and ideologically. As the so-called `showcase of democracy in Asia’
by the United States, the urgency of stemming the `Huk tide’ in the country was palpably clear .
In a country that suffered the ravages
of War, tenants of Central Luzon who temporarily enjoyed freedom from their
landlords ( who escaped to Manila) ,experienced solidarity with the Huks, who
promised them `lands to the tillers.’ Huk supporters have increased to 100,000
in Central Luzon alone. Their popularity was undiminished until a systematic
counter-insurgency program was developed by Ramon Magsaysay,the Quirino
Administration’s Secretary of Defense and Edward Lansdale of the Joint US-Phil.
Military Group(JUSMAG). The birth of Economic Development Corps Mindanao, in
conjunction with a revitalized military spelled doom for the Communists HMB. By
1957, the threat of Communism became a thing of the past, albeit temporarily.
The Mindanao location of the EDCOR
settlements would create a new meaning
in resettlement. Although historically considered as the Philippines’ frontier,
its Land of Promise, to put into it former rebels of different background
seemingly is a no-brainer, not well-thought out in terms of nation-building.
For Mindanao during the 1950’s was
already saturated with settlers; and its natives, specially the Muslims, were
already sounding their alarm. There were the Tawan-tawan uprisings in
Kapatagan, the Kamlon uprising in Sulu and the Sandab brothers in Cotabato
which were land-related disputes. EDCOR settlers would therefore be another
prey for the already volatile situation.
I pointed out in my doctoral
dissertation[1]
that the EDCOR resettlement program was merely intended as counter-insurgency
propaganda, no more no less.
This paper would aim to go beyond
EDCOR’s counter-insurgency formula and, deriving from current issues on peace
process in Mindanao would examine how resettlement has historically been a tool for nation-building. For this purpose
I am going to re-interpret resettlement, its implications on nation-building
base on present conditions obtaining in selected areas of Mindanao, primarily former EDCOR
settlement in Kapatagan, Lanao (now
Sapad,Lanao del Norte) and a NARRA settlement in Wao,Lanao del Sur. NARRA or
National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Administration was an offshoot of the
EDCOR experience under Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippine Republic
(1954-57).
RESETTLEMENT
AND COLONIZATION
Spanish `reduccion’ and American `agricultural colonization projects’ were
similarly aimed to transform the natives into willing and able subjects working
towards their particular colonial goals and purposes. Spanish ecclesiastical
objective of converting the native to become devout Catholics transferred the
natives into planned settlements `bajo
la campana’ or under the bells
for their close watch. American
homestead farms or agricultural colonies were designed like military camps
under close watch by their soldiers.
In Mindanao, the Spanish Jesuits `Tamontaka Experiment’ resonated in the `American agricultural
colonies project’ where the goals of economic productivity was made in the
service of creating a nation of willing and able subjects/citizens[2].
For instance at Tamontaka, Cotabato Jesuit missionaries
developed a farm settlement where former Tiruray slaves whom they manumitted from their Moro masters
were given religious instructions and training for agricultural livelihood as
well as carpentry and masonry for the men ; and for the women,
housekeeping, embroidery and
other cottage industries. Women and men lived in separate dormitories and were
expected to later marry and have families of their own. They eventually
established their own dwellings and formed clusters of communities. These communities
resembled the laid-out plans in a reduccion.
Thus a kind of a model town was what the Tamontaka experiement was expected to
yield. Support for this project was taken through the Obras Pias and
contributions from pious citizens in Manila.
As can be
gleaned from the Reports of Jesuit missionaries in the Jesuit Letters,[3]
their plans were carried out and were
initially successful. Moro datus
became curious and were amazed at the changes made among their former slaves,
now skilful craftsmen. They would even ask them to help in building their torogans, or in doing some masonry. This
pleased the missionaries because in coming to their missions the moros also became curious of their
religious practices and asked questions. Eventually some of the moro chiefs became friends with the
missionaries until one datu named
Ali, who had been suspicious of the missionaries took offense of an act done by
the Jesuits who built their church on a location which was supposedly a
burial ground for Ali’s ancestors. It
caused a military intervention on the part of the Spanish government were Ali
and his men were defeated. But the damage was already done. The dormitories
were reduced into ashes, their barns looted and their livestocks and fowls
perished. The Mission was unable to restore itself after this debacle.
This
Tamontaka experiment (1873-97) initiated
by the Jesuit missionaries in Mindanao which aimed nonetheless for
proselytization suggests a method for nation-building towards a
self-sufficient,homogenous citizenry similar to the `ideal citizen’ concept of
the Americans in their agricultural colony project in Northern Cotabato. Before
the end of Spanish Rule actually Governor Blanco , already had in mind the
resettlement of Mindanao with people from Luzon and Visayas that was supposedly
to follow after the Lanao pacification campaign. This idea could have been
inspired by the Jesuit’s Tamontaka experiment as Blanco’s Lanao campaign was
almost contemporaneous to the this Jesuit’s resettlement project in Cotabato.
Moreover, while aiming at
agricultural self-sufficiency, the Americans believe in resettling farmers from
Luzon and Visayas to assume their role as model citizens of the natives in the
course of interacting with them. Conceived as part of the Filipinization policy
of Governor General Harrison to make a `Filipino
out of the Moro’, the
agricultural colonies were created at the end of the pacification campaign of
Pershing. It is to be noted that Pershing’s pacification campaigns were
characterized by bloody massacres, such as the Bud Dajo incident, when it
imposed its disarmament policy.
The agricultural colonies project in
1913 thus coincided with the creation of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu
ending the military rule in Mindanao[4].
RESETTLEMENT AND NATION-BUILDING
A lesson in colonialism tells us that
a centralized bureaucracy makes for a
more efficient control of the subject nation. A
stronger Filipino nation was inadvertently created by a weakening Spanish power that was challenged
by American military subjugation. Through its first civil governor, William Howard Taft’s legalistic economic policies,
resettlement was enhanced, paving the way for a systematic inclusion of
Mindanao’s untapped resources into the newly colonized nation. The Treaty of
Paris of 1898, ostensibly, gave the United States every right to occupy even
Mindanao and Sulu’s Muslim territories considered not yet fully pacified by the
Spaniards. Though by 1913, these were militarily brought under American
sovereignty, civilian rule under John Carpenter, appointed by Governor
Harrison. This was the Department of
Mindanao and Sulu which effected the first agricultural colonies in Cotabato
that resettled farmers from Luzon and
Visayas to Cotabato in order to solve inadequate production of rice and
corn . Corollary to this mission was for
these farmers from the North to gradually `Filipinize’ the natives in this far-flung Philippine territory.
Thus, a culturally homogenized agricultural state would be an asset that would best serve American interest in
consolidating its rule on Mindanao.
Six
agricultural colonies were established in Northern Cotabato from 1913-1919. Although considerably
successful for having increased the production of rice and corn and making
headway in initiating a harmonized inter-ethnic relations in Cotabato, the
succeeding Wood’s administration considered these inconsequential compared with
what it considered exorbitant government expenditures. The resettlement
projects, however, were revived during Quezon’s Commonwealth Regime following the same objectives instituted by
the Americans. Furthermore, Quezon thought this to help ameliorate the tenants
who were already restive in Luzon. Thus, the National Land Settlement
Administration (NLSA) was born on October 22,1938 with the promulgation of the
Commonwealth Act no.441.
Compared with the
agricultural colonies of the Americans, this was a huge project funded by the National Development
Corporation(NDC) . Quezon borrowed from this corporation P200,000.00 to finance
the settlement project.[5]He
envisioned a Mindanao that would not only serve the government’s need for
increased revenue but also a well-integrated citizenry , peaceful and
law-abiding. Through his Social Justice program, landless peasants from Luzon were given lands
in famously fertile Allah and Koronadal
Valleys of southern Cotabato.
Alongside the NLSA resettlement project was a comprehensive
development plan of tapping
the hydro-electric resources of
Lanao’s Maria Cristina Falls for industrial purposes. We know of this today as
the National Power Corporation.
With the end of the Commonwealth
Period and the inauguration of the independent Philippine Republic,
resettlement as a panacea for social and economic ills, would, among others,
engender complex socio-political and economic problems. One of which was the
resettlement of the Huk rebel surrenderees from Luzon and Visayas to Mindanao. The Quirino Administrations’ LASEDECO (Land
Settlement Development Corporation), the successor of NLSA proved to be less
effective compared with the military’s Economic Development Corps or EDCOR.
Although created under his administration, the EDCOR was a military outfit
which was autonomously administered and funded by the Philippine Army. Ramon
Magsaysay together with Edward Lansdale, conceived of an integrated approach to
insurgency where weaning supporters of Communism could be successful should
their attraction to it will cease. The primary attraction which was the communists `land to the tillers’ was transformed into
`land for the landless’; and Mindanao was pictured as that land of promise for
the surrendered Huks. In time, this
EDCOR idea proved to be successful.[6]
EDCOR IN MINDANAO
The Setting of the EDCOR settlements : Kapatagan, Lanao and
Buldon,Cotabato
As the name
aptly describes it, the Kapatagan Valley is flat at the center, sloping softly
towards the south and east across the hilly Mt. Iniaon. Barrio Buriasan, where
the EDCOR farm was situated, was a vast vacant public land of 1,690 hectares
which was later expanded to 3,400 hectares in 1954. Seven hundred hectares of
this land were allotted to registered owners and the rest to registered
settlers. It was opened through Proclamation no.375and became a settlement for
484 settler-families, which included sixty-four former Huks (who remained from
the original one hundred rebel families in 1951), twenty-seven retired soldiers
and nine civilian[7]The
land was partially cleared and developed by the Army and civilian volunteers in
early 1951. Later, houses were built and roads were graded. A schoolhouse,
administration building, dispensary and medical service facilities were added
to the settlement[8] By
the time the settlement became a municipality, the total area developed was
799.4965 hectares. Named Sapad municipality later, it comprised the barangays
of Pili,Baning, Karibang, Patebon, Karkum, Taraka and Dansalan. [9]
The
settlement procedure for EDCOR farms in Kapatagan, Buldon and later, Alamada
followed almost the same pattern:
The
townsites were designated to function as modern agglomerated
communities
in that house lots were laid side by side in clustered village
pattern.
For instance, at (Kapatagan) the site was originally situated into
126
farm lots from the townsite, which had orderly rows of thatched cot-
tages and numerous Army and community facilities.
The dispersed
settler-houses
(were) well-constructed on wooden pilings, on palm leaf
sides
and thatched roofs. Homelots (were) supposedly to have place for
vegetables,
flowers, fruits, shade trees, toilet, garbage pit, poultry project
And pig
sty. Electricity was also provided including a radio center for outside
communication.[10]
Buldon is a
hilly area with an elevation of 1,500 feet above sea level. Located along the
boundary of Cotabato and Lanao provinces where Simuay River cuts through, the
Buldon (also called EDCOR) farm is situated on the rolling foothills at the
base of the sharp-peaked mountains . The climate is not as hot and humid as in
Kapatagan and the area is conducive to upland crops. Alamada EDCOR has been
carved out of Libungan municipality, 18 miles north of Midsayap town proper. It
has an undulating terrain surrounded by hills and mountains. At the same time
of settlement kaingin trees abound. This was the third EDCOR settlement to be
opened in Mindanao and it received its first batch of settlers in 1956.
EDCOR MANAGEMENT TOWARDS PRODUCTIVITY & REHABILITATION
Within the
purview of the Spanish reduccion and
American agricultural colonies, resettlement had always been considered as
integral to the consolidation of colonial power. Proceeding from a military
conquest, the population is made to serve the colonizers’ vested interests with
a combination of ameliorative , one of which is resettlement, and militarists,
programs . This pattern continued even after the supposed national liberation
of the conquered nation. This time it is called `internal colonialism’, i.e.
domestic elites’ vested interests, at the expense of the majority, continue to
dominate national economic policies.
The newly
established post-war Philippine Republic answer to a nation fragmented by
Communist insurgency was, among others, resettlement through the EDCOR in
Mindanao.
At this
juncture I am going to attempt at answering the following questions: How was it
administered? And what was its status according to its beneficiaries? And what
were the results of its monitoring and evaluation if there were any? What
happened to the settlers?
ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDCOR.
Administratively,
EDCOR was under the direct supervision of the Civilian Affairs of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines which was in charge of the Huk surrenderees. It was
formally established on December 15,1950. Funding was provided for through the
Army Appropriations Act of 1951 intended for rebel rehabilitation. By February 22,1951, the first EDCOR project
at Kapatagan in Lanao was established. Edward Lansdale, who was with the
group,recounted:
Magsaysay, Mirasol, a detachment of troops,
surveyors and I
went to Mindanao and looked over
the area. It was lush, virgin jungle
several kilometres inland from
the sea, reached by an abominable
muddy track of a road. A few
small farms lay along this road, with rich-
looking soil and reportedly
abundant crops...A corps of engineers who
executed the settlement lay-out
plan of Magsaysay and Mirasol were
with us[11].
Three EDCOR
projects were established: in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte; in Buldon, Cotabato;
and in Isabela Province in February 1951,November 1951 and April
21,1953,respectively. Although no data are available as to the total number of
Huks who were resettled in all the areas. Alvin Scaff during his field work in
Kapatagan(September 1953), mentioned that there were one hundred settlers but
did not specify how many of these were Huks. Shalom recorded that “when the
project was completed, fewer than 1,000 families had been resettled... and only
246 of these were ex-Huks.”[12]
The project
was opened to two groups:1) captured or surrendered Huks, called former rebels;
and 2)former officers, rank and file soldiers and trainees and some private
citizens called the `stabilizers’. It
aimed to rehabilitate, train for gainful occupation and re-educate the first
group; while the latter would serve as “stabilizing influence in the
re-education and reformation of the former”.[13]
EDCOR
farming proceeded in four stages: During the first year, each family was to
plant rice seedlings on a two-hectare land. The family was expected to
eventually become self-supporting and would have surplus with which to pay
their debts. During the second year, they would be given two more hectares of
land to plant with either ramie or abaca for additional repayment of loan; in
the third year, they would be given two more hectares for the same purpose; and
in the fourth year they would be given two or more hectares for the same
reason. In short,the system of hectare increases was to enable repayment of
loans more rapidly.[14]
EDCOR’S State of Productivity in 1955- from a
Military Survey
A survey[15]
was made by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to assess the productivity of
the EDCOR farms during the first three years in 1955. The study interviewed 92
settlers out of 110 in Kapatagan and 163 settlers out of 170 in Buldon. Not
included in the interview were those settlers who were out of town, in
hospital, newly accepted, or not available for other reasons. Its finding were
the following: 1)Self-sufficiency was not yet attained by the settlers. 2) The
program of rehabilitation still had to progress; and 3) Its grandiose objective
of social amelioration should be made more realistic.
The settlers’ failure
to achieve self-sufficiency
According to the Military Survey:
Of the 92 setlers samples in I Arevalo(Kapatagan)EDCOR
Farm, 27 or 29.4 percent (were) in the upper or more successful
groups;43 percent average and 22 or 24 percent failures. Of the
163 settler sample in the (Buldon) farm,36 or 22 percent belong
to the more successful group; 84 or 1.6 percent belong to the
more successful groups; 84 or
51.6 percent average, and 43 or
26.4 percent failures [16]
Note that the index of success or failure were the following: successful groups are those with income[note: this was probably yearly income, although this was not indicated] between P1,600 to P5,600; middle or average group from P800.00 to P1,600.00 and the failures from none to P800[17].
Thus, the
survey concluded that the expectations of the government were not met. These
were: that the greater majority should have produced income between P1,650 to
P5,600.00 and the percentage of failures should have been smaller. This also suggested
that the EDCOR settler was not yet self-sufficient, and therefore, still needed
government subsidy.
However,
according to the report,”(A)lthough the per capita income of the settlers in
both farms, Kapatagan and Buldon which was P469.02 and P317.85 respectively,
was short of their target goal,it was still high compared to non-settlers even
as the rice farmers whose income was P217.69 and the corn farmers with only
P112.09 income.[18]
Huk rehabilitation was yet to continue
An important
goal of the project was to restructure the mold of the Huk mentality to one of
a self-sufficient owner-cultivator type of farmer who is at the same time a model
law-abiding citizen. It was hoped that more Huks would be convinced to surrender and lead peaceful
ordinary lives.
The survey,
however, found out that after three years of settler farming there were still
former Huks considered unfit for farm work. Expectedly, those who were
considered of `doubtful loyalty’ or the so-called `red’ were the least
productive. Conversely, those of the `stabilizer group’ or `retired soldiers
became more successful. To wit:
Of
the 58 ex-Huks interviewed in the Kapatagan EDCOR farm,
12
or 13.04% were more successful,26 or 28.36 average and 20 or
21.74
below average. These 58 ex-Huks interviewed,27 or 16.5 were
more
successful, 73 or 44.73% average and 42 or 25.76 below average.
in
this farm,therefore, of the 163 settlers interviewed ¼ who were failures
were
ex-Huks.[19]
Thus,
according to the survey, “most of the (former or retired soldiers) were more
successful than 1/5 to ¼ of the total number of ex-Huks.”[20]
Magsaysay
attributed such failures to the settlers’ shortcomings themselves since “in all
settlements...the supervision and administration have consistently been the
same...(It had thus become incumbent for his administration) to correct his
(the failed settler) faults and deficiencies with the end in view of making him
productive and self-sustaining.”[21]
Another
study was done by Alvin Scaff, an American sociologist. He visited the EDCOR
Kapatagan and Buldon during its earlier period (September and November 1953)
and was impressed by these farms’ accomplishments. He considered it (EDCOR) as
the “Philippines’ answer to communism” (which was the title of his book) in
weaning the rebels from this radical ideology. From his interviews, he found
out that, indeed, despite the settlers’ problems of adjustment, the government was
doing well at least at its earlier phase. The responses he received were fairly
representative of all the Huk settlers of varying backgrounds.
Furthermore,
in Scaff’s study of 1953,Kapatagan EDCOR, only nineteen cases or six percent of
the total number of settlers at the end of 1953 (year of his study) left the
project or were dismissed. According to Scaff,
“Six of those who (who abandoned the settlement) were convicted of
theft; five refused to work and develop their farms; three deserted; two were found
in illegal possession of firearms; two resigned because of poor health; one
tried to incite trouble against the government.”[22]
From Scaff’s
interviews, the following were the enumerated problems during the first three
years of EDCOR settlement: illness, inability to pay one’s loan, lack of
supplies when these were cut off; road problems and favouritism. It was also
recalled it was in 1953 when an ex-convict named only as Rivera, caused trouble
in the farm community[23].
Lack of funds, further exacerbated the problem. Its tight budget of P320,000
for its six month operation could no longer sustain a drainage project and other
farm needs such as carabaos and plows.[24]
Despite all these, Alvin Scaff considered EDCOR as a success.
On the
whole, Jesus Vargas, Magsaysay’s chief of staff said:
The
EDCOR exist not merely to rehabilitate. It (also) exist...for
the purpose of helping the nation
find new means to bring about a
faster
and more scientific rural development. We believe that in the
effort
to solve the country’s tenancy problems, the EDCOR’s experience
could
be a sound basis for new legislations. [25]
According to Magsaysay, a former Secretary of Defense , now
President by 1954, “The success of the
EDCOR experiment in resettling ex-dissidents had added a new concept in the
mission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-that it cannot wage a war
successfully by armed struggle alone, but had also to pursue further the
greater task of rehabilitating physically and morally those involved in the
armed struggle.”[26]
THE POLITICAL SITUATION ON MINDANAO(1955-60) AND THE EDCOR
SETTLEMENTS
The economic
prosperity of the EDCOR settlements, as shown by the increase of production and
population, was implicit in the peace and order prevailing in the areas. The
security provided by military presence in the farm settlement ostensibly
assured the settlers that they would go on living their farm life undisturbed.
The land
issue, however, became the prominent bone of contention between the EDCOR and the
Muslims. There were reports of Muslims contesting recognized public land at the
EDCOR farms.[27]
For instance, upon investigation, the Philippine Constabulary learned that a
certain Umpa who was suspected to be the
“landgrabber” was actually an employee of the Lanao Provincial
government. He(Umpa) reported that when EDCOR was established in Kapatagan,
land for his men behind the EDCOR area was assured; but when his men developed
their parcels of land, they were forced to evacuate because EDCOR settlers came
to occupy their attached farmlands. The same report alleged that the Maranaos
harassed the settlers. Apparently, it was the
military presence that averted open violence in this area.
Nonetheless,
after the surrender of Tawan-tawan and Kamlon in 1951 and 1954, respectively,
there was relative calm all over Mindanao and Sulu.
President Magsaysay and EDCOR
Magsaysay’s
sudden death in 1957 [28]
brought a sense of insecurity among the Kapatagan EDCOR settlers. Since the
termination of their subsidy coincided with the demise of the president, they
thought that the succeeding Garcia administration was not sympathetic to their
plight. It was apparent due to their unpaid loans they faced imminent
foreclosure of their mortgaged land. They sought an audience with President
Garcia, but to no avail. It was a policy of his administration to impose
austerity and fiscal discipline. Thus, for the Kapatagan EDCOR settlers it seemed that the death of
Magsaysay likewise ended the EDCOR project.
THE EDCOR and NARRA
During the Magsaysay Administration
When Ramon
Magsaysay was the elected president, his image as the “man of the masses” and
his `land to the landless’ program gained prominence with the EDCOR and the NARRA.
At the
outset of his administration, Magsaysay directed Secretary Balao of the EDCOR
to advise the settlers to obtain a P750.00 per hectare loan for coffee
plantation from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. The purpose of this
loan program, according to Magsaysay was to “enhance the settlers`capability to
contribute to production of cash crops and improve the financial condition of
the planters.”[29]
As gathered from this author’s interview, the settlers in Buldon benefitted
from this program, specially at the time when rat infestation and forest fires
plagued the place in the late sixties.
NARRA
Mindanao projects on the other hand, just like EDCOR has to reckon with land
problems. It was reported that settlers were shipped without assurance of the
lands in the settlement where they were assigned.[30]
Beloso, the NARRA manager was ordered to correct the situation.
A more
serious problem encountered was the land dispute between settlers and natives
in the area. A land conflict between the moro
claimants and the NARRA settlers almost developed into a bloody encounter. In
August 1956, a certain Datu Sangke insisted on a claim consisting of 650
hectares located at Kauran, Datu Piang where a NARRA reservation was located.
According to Datu Sangke, Kauran was one of the few remaining places where
they, as natives, could settle. Most of the Koronadal and Allah Valley had been
occupied by Christians.[31]
Two hundred and sixty-four Muslim families and one hundred and three Christian
families fought over the controversial land. According to the Christian
settlers, they occupied the land in 1952 with the permission of another Muslim
claimant.
The land
conflict was settled through a division of farm lots, in which greater portion
was allotted to Datu Sangke’s men. An agreement called the `Pledge of
Brotherhood’ was signed between the Muslim and Christian groups. This
temporarily forestalled the conflict.
At Wao, (a
town of Lanao del Sur) NARRA reports of anomalies committed by Busran Kalaw
reached Malacanang in June 1898. Kalaw, according to these reports,cheated the
settlers of their supplies, sold their rice supplies at exorbitant prices, and
censored their letters and radiograms to government authorities. The settlers:
Gregorio Abasta, Anita Reyes,Mariano Reyes, Amado Reyes and Arturo Angeles,
presented to the President invoices showing they were given only a few gantas
of rice a week, out of their weekly rations of fifteen gantas each.[32]
Meantime, in
Maramag (Bukidnon) NARRA, Jose Crisol (who conducted investigation there)
reported that there were “administrative operational deficiencies” in the settlement and recommended the
improvement of the road from Maramag to Wao. Moreover, it was also noted that
some settlers from Wao wanted to transfer to Maramag.[33]
At Davao, a
NARRA project was abolished when it was found out that this government agency
was actually the landgrabber.
Following
Magsaysay’s death, the settlers in EDCOR Kapatagan, recalled seven significant developments: Muslim conflict,
selling of land and animals, settlers returning to their original places, end
of EDCOR’s days of glory[34],decrease
in agricultural production, local government’s takeover and the building of
more houses. Major changes were: 1)most of Kapatagan settlers’ support stopped;
2)vigorous campaign to collectsettlers’ debts to the government; 3)EDCOR’s
turnover to Land Authority in 1957; and
4) its eventual phase-out and incorporation into the newly formed Sapad
municipality in 1969.
In 1959,
serious management problems beset the Gallego EDCOR in Buldon. Army Chief of
Staff Alejo Santos ordered a military investigation of the Gallego Farms
regarding the reported abuses of military personanel against settlers in the
form of usurious credit, charging settlers for use of military vehicles at
exorbitant rates, confiscation of work animals, farm lots and other property of
the settlers who failed to pay borrowed money, and sale of drugs and medicines
which were originally issued free to the settlers.[35]
Furthermore,
Senator Genaro Magsaysay, who visited Libungan (Genio EDCOR farm or Alamada) in
late 1962, confirmed landgrabbing cases there. Allotted lots for settlers were
said to have been withdrawn and finally,fell into the hands of moneyed people
and certain government officials. These landgrabbing cases were denied by the then
Acting Bureau of Lands Director.[36]
Apparently, the latter was implicated in the anomaly. Related to this report
was the charge of illegal logging at the EDCOR farm in Buldon.
A case was
filed in 1963 against a lumber company on an EDCOR reservation of 134,041
hectares in Buldon, Cotabato. The company had been logging in Buldon since
1958, in an area reserved by Ramon Magsaysay under Proclamation No.6(March
2,1954). The permission was given through an official who was unauthorized to
act on behalf of EDCOR, according to Defense Secretary Macario Peralta.
Forestry Director Bernal said that through a series of amendments, the company
increased its logging areas from 49,000 hectares to 107,400 hectares in a
matter of two months, and not without the official consent of the Defense
Secretary.[37]
Natives Anxiety Over the Creation of the EDCOR settlement in
their area
A concrete
instance of a Maguindanaoan’s complaint over the loss of what they believe to
be their land to the EDCOR project was reflected in the following:
We
are poor...The government brought in ex-rebel from
the
other end of the country, people who are alien to us, settled
them
down on our land, gave them everything they need to farm,
and
(laid) out towns for them. We ask(ed) for the same consideration.
We
(were) told we do not quality...We do not know how to compete
with
these people...Soon we shall be landless people on our own
home
country.[38]
In such a situation, according to Melvin Mednick, an
anthropologist who studied the Muslims in Mindanao, “the effect of the EDCOR
project was...a good example of a situation in which a solution of the problems
(in Luzon) turn(ed) into the breeding ground for another.”[39]In
an effort to prevent such occurrence, the government allowed a segment on the
settlement reserved for the Maguindanaoans. By April 4,1956 the government
authorized 227 Moro families to occupy and settle lands at Genio EDCOR project
which, according to Ciriaco Mirasol, EDCOR chief, “accomplished two things: 1)it
filled the project up t To capacity and 2)obviated possible Muslim charges that
the government provid(ed) more privileges to Christians than (the) native(s) of
the area.”[40]
In 1959 at the
Genio (Alamada) EDCOR farm , many Muslims were granted land . This was
corroborated by a report which stated that: “At Genio Alamada EDCOR, 105
enlisted men and eighteen Muslim farmers were admitted as settlers in
newly-cleared Balatawan-Dado Area of Genio Farm, Libungan Midsayap, Cotabato.”[41]
HUK ALIENATION AND THE CREATION OF THE SEMP
In 1959, the
government created another resettlement program Socio-Economic Military Program
(SEMP).[42]
SEMP was
intended to “help retired enlisted men and ex-trainees to acquire their own
land which they (would) work as homestead until they (could) have a title to
it”. The program was under the supervision of the Philippine Army which
acquired public land not reserved for NARRA nor the EDCOR. Under the same program, the Army helped the
settlers by opening roads, particularly for transporting the settlers’
machinery and equipment, cleaning the forest, planning the community, sending
tools and advancing supplies.[43]
Evidently,
the creation of SEMP as an exclusive military resettlement project formalized
the alienation of the former insurgents-the Huks, from the rest of the
settlers. The government considered the `Huk menace’ as solved and as a
precautionary measue, they had to be isolated from the Maguindanaoans who were
also potential rebels. The land issue remained a sensitive matter, specially
for the latter. In fact, in Alamada EDCOR which was the biggest settlement
of`673 settlers, only seven were former Huks while 97 were militarymen .
Moreover, it
would be this SEMP-EDCOR in the Alamada settlement (also called Barrira-Genio),
in comparison with the other EDCOR settlements, which would be the last to be
turned over to civilian administration under the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in
1972.[44]
This fact suggests that EDCOR Alamada retained its military nature for almost
two decades. When the author visited the area in 1994, she was impressed that
much of its military settlement lay-out remained. According to Maynard Dow, an
American military officer,
(T)he
EDCOR ha(d) made significant strides...When it
was
apparent that there were insufficient ex-Huks and other
settlers
for filling the original quota, the government took
definite
steps to include indigenous moro. Moro
settler
heads of families were incorporated into the EDCOR
(Alamada)
in 1956[45].
SUMMARY
Problems inherent in newly-formed settlements were
also apparent in the EDCOR settlements and these can be best delineated into:
1)economic b)social and c) political:
Economic Problems
While
contributions to agricultural production of rice and corn were clearly seen in
the Kapatagan area, when in 1953, it was considered as the `rice bowl’ of the
entire Lanao Province, disease and drought brought such glory to an end in
1959. As for EDCOR, government expectations on settlers’ productivity remained
unfulfilled. Magsaysay attributed this to the characteristics of the settlers
themselves. That is, the settler-dissidents were mostly, not farmers.
Social Problems
Since the
EDCOR was intended to rehabilitate and re-orient ex-Huks into becoming loyal
and peace-loving citizens of the Republic, it was expected that the
opportunities afforded to them as owner-cultivators in the farms, side by side
with military men, would turn them into one. The EDCOR `experiment’ proved that
loyal settlers were the most productive. Thus, the high rate of failures
suggested that there were still a number of former Huks who were impervious to
`rehabilitation’. Impliedly, this meant that the project would have to
continue.
Political Problems
It is
obvious that a certain weakness on Magsaysay’s land resettlement structures was
manifested as soon as he died. Apparently, the project’s (EDCOR and NARRA)
continuation depended greatly upon the government’t tight supervision and
fiscal policies. During the second half decade of EDCOR’s life, Magsaysay’s
death in 1957 was a major disaster for the settlers. Gradually, the project was
terminated; from the austere management of the Garcia administration up to its
final abolition in 1968 by the Land Authority.
Compounding
lack of support for the project were landgrabbing complaints of the native
Maguindanaoans; graft and corrupt practices of government officials e.g. grant
of permit to a logging company, and the insecurity of the Kapatagan settlers in
living in a strange environment without government support. It was thus
inevitable that EDCOR settlers would want to settle elsewhere and look for the
proverbial greener pastures.
Moreover,
part of the motivations behind the `land to the landless’ project, as discussed
in this chapter, was mainly the desire to picture Ramon Magsaysay as the man of
the `masses’. It was a time when the people lost their faith in the integrity
of the established government. But true enough, Magsaysay’s peasant
amelioration projects, combined with military determination to quell armed
rebellion, not only diminished peasant support for the Huks and paved the way
for its eventual downfall, but also catapulted him to the presidency. All these
were possible with the tremendous support given to him by the United States
which saw him as the defender of their so-called `showcase of democracy in Asia’- the Philippines.
No cultural
conflict was yet discernible during this period since interaction between
settlers and the natives was still minimal. The culture-gap would be noticeable
when the settler would have to deal with the opposing land concept of the
natives. They would be forced to face the natives as the EDCOR administration
would give way to the Land Authority in 1967.
CONCLUSION
On the
whole, the most tangible proof of EDCOR’s success, however, was in the realm of
counter-insurgency. As an AFP project under its psy-war operations, the EDCOR
as the government’s `land for the landless’ project appeared as an effective
argument against continuing the Huk rebellion. With the AFP appropriating this
Huk slogan, the movement’s raison d’etre
vanished. Moreover, with the former soldiers and former rebels having to
live together in one community, the former Huk settlers developed a certain
degree of respect for the military, represented by Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary
of Defense, in his effort to provide their necessities. Consequently, by the
year 1952, the year before the presidential election, it was considered that
Huk following had diminished and its influence over the peasants had gone.
On Mindanao,
the EDCOR project served as a model for the succeeding resettlement such as the
NARRA upon the election of Magsaysay to
the presidency. NARRA became the successor of the abolished LASEDECO and opened
settlement projects in Davao,Cotabato, Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon. NARRA also opened settlements projects in
Sulu and on Palawan and was considered the first serious effort of the government
at resettlement. Unlike EDCOR, however, the project gave priority to landless
farmers in congested areas of the country and to military retirees and
trainees.
An extension
of the EDCOR project in Alamada was the Socio-Economic Military Project (SEMP)
established in 1959. Unlike Kapatagan and Buldon, EDCOR-SEMP in Alamada was
intended for soldiers, and later on, even Muslims were accommodated in the
settlements. Apparently, the accommodation of Muslims was intended to silence
the growing criticism of the Muslim natives that they were slowly being eased
out in favour of the settlers from Luzon, by Huk rebels.
The founding
of SEMP in 1959 coincided with serious management problems in the Gallego farm
in Buldon. Report of abuses reached in military, such as usurious credit,
charging settlers for use of military vehicles at exorbitant rates,
confiscation of work animals, farm lots and other property of the settlers.
Added to these were landgrabbing cases of moneyed people and illegal loggers.
Genaro Magsaysay, then a Senator, also reported that there were illegal land
usurpation cases done by some rich people from Luzon in Alamada.
Finally,
resettlement as the government’s attempt to address its political, social and
economic problems could be seen, with the EDCOR Mindanao as a case in point,
follows the colonialists practice of incorporating northerners with southerners
to subdue latent recalcitrance of rebels from both geographical regions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS/MONOGRAPHS
Abueva,Jose V. RAMON MAGSAYSAY: A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House,1971.
Arcilla,S.J., Jose S. JESUIT
MISSIONARY LETTERS FROM MINDANAO vol1. Q.C.:University of the Philippines
Center for Integrative and Development Studies,National Historical Institute
and the UP Press,2000.
Armed Forces of the Phillippines.
SURVEY OF PRODUCTIVITY n.p.,n.d.
Gowing,Peter Gordon. MANDATE IN
MOROLAND. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OF MUSLIM FILIPINOS,1899-1920.Q.C. Philippine
Center for Advanced Studies,1977.
Hayami,Yujiro, Quisumbing,Ma.Agnes R.
And Adriano,Lourdes S. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE LAND REFORM PARADIGM. Q.C.: Ateneo
de Manila 1990.
Keith,Agnes Newton. BARE FEET IN THE
PALACE. Boston: An Atlantic Monthly Press Book,1953.
Lansdale,Edward Geary. IN THE MIDST
OF WARS: AN AMERICAN MISSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. New York: Harper and Row
Publishers,1972.
Muslim, Macapado. THE MORO ARMED
STRUGGLE IN THE PHILIPPINES. Marawi: Office of the President and College of
Public Affairs,MSU.1994.
Quirino,Carlos. MAGSAYSAY OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Manila: RM Memorial Society,1964.
Scaff, Alvin H. THE PHILIPPINES
ANSWER TO COMMUNISM. Calif.: Stanford University Press,1955.
Shalom, Stephen Rosskam. THE UNITED
STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES: A STUDY IN NEOCOLONIALISM. Q.C.: New Day
Publishers,1986.
Vargas, Jesus . COMMUNISM IN DECLINE:
THE HUK CAMPAIGN.n.p. 1957
ARTICLES,PERIODICALS ,PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AND PAMPHLETS
Abaya-Ulindang,Faina C. “Slaves and
Migrants in Mindanao During the late 18th toEarly 19th
Centuries” MSU GRADUATE FORUM. Vol.5 nos 1&2 (2007)pp.187-225
Anonymous. “Magsaysay’s Claim to
Edcor Authorship Exposed”(Pamphlet)
Armed Forces of the Philippines,
“Survey of Productivity” n.p. n.d.
DAILY MIRROR 1956 clippings
MANILA TIMES 1949-63 clippings
MANILA CHRONICLE 1954 clippings
OFFICIAL GAZETTE vol.51 no.6 June
1955
OFFICIAL GAZETTE vol.52 no.5 May 1957
OFFICIAL GAZETTE vol.52 no.6 June
1,1958
OFFICIAL GAZETTE vol.52 no.12
September 30,1958
Porte,Catherine. “Ambitious Plans for
Mindanao Announced.” FAR EASTERN SURVEY vol.vii (November 1938) pp.213-274.
THESIS/DISSERTATION
Abaya-Ulindang,Faina C. “EDCOR and
Counter-Insurgency: A Study of Economic Development Corps Settlements in
Mindanao (1950-70)” Thesis Ph.D History. University of the Philippines.1996
Dow,Maynard Weston. “Counter-Insurgency
and Nation-Building. A Comparative Study of Post-World War II Anti-Guerilla
Settlement in Malaya,Philippines and South Vietnam.” Thesis. Ph.D
Geography,Syracuse University. January 1965.
[1] Abaya-Ulindang,Faina. “EDCOR and
Counter-Insurgency: A Study of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR)
Settlements in Mindanao (1950-70)”. Ph.D History Thesis. University of the Philippines-Diliman.
1996
[2] Abaya-Ulindang,Faina “Slaves and
Migrants in Mindanao During the early 19th to late 20th
Centuries: A Comparative Social History”. MSU GRADUATE FORUM .vol.5
nos.1&2(2007) pp. 187-205
[3]
JESUIT MISSIONARY LETTERS FROM MINDANAO vol.1. Arcilla, Jose S. S.J.
ed.,trans.,annotators. (Q.C.: University of the Philippines Center for
Integrative & Development Studies, National Historical Institute and the UP
Press,2000)
[4] See for example Gowing, Peter
Gordon. MANDATE IN MOROLAND:THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT OF MUSLIM
FILIPINOS,1899-1920. (Q.C.: Phil. Center for Advanced Studies,1977
[5] NDC
was created in 1937. “It was allowed to contract lease agreements with foreign
and domestic investors for exploitation of public agricultural and mineral
lands over and above the 1,024 hectare limit stipulated by the 1935
Constitution. B.F.Goodrich and Goodyear Tires pioneered in establishing 1,000
ha. rubber plantation in 1919. It facilitated the development of large-scale
plantations and the policy of encouraging small settlers in the “Land of
Promise” which created contradictions in land-use policy in later years.”
Hayami,Yujiro et al. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE LAND REFORM PARADIGM.(Q.C.: Ateneo
de Manila Press,1990)p.43
[6]
See for example, Abueva, Jose
V. RAMON MAGSAYSAY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing
House,1971)]
[7] Manila
Times,January 19,1954. Cf. DEVELOPMENT ACADEMY OF THE PHILIPPINES. HUMAN
SETTLEMENT PHILIPPINE FRONTIER SETTLEMENT MODELS:INVENTORY AND SUMMARY
PROFILES. Prepared by the Frontier and Rural Settlement Research Team of the
Rural Transformation Project.n.d. On p.506-`that there were 139 families as
original settlers. There were a total of 352 residential lots of 600 square
meters each, 140 farm lots of six hectares each by 1954,total area developed
was 799,495 hectares.
[8] Scaff,Alvin
H. THE PHILIPPINE ANSWER TO COMMUNISM.(California: Stanford University
Press,1955)p.108
[9] From
“Lanao Resettlement Project no.2.n.d.,n.p.photocopy fron Sapad Municipality
Deparment of Agricultural Reforms(DAR) Records.
[10] Dow,Maynard
Winston , “Counter-insurgency and
Nation-building: A Comparative Study of Post World War II Anti-Guerilla
Settlement in Malaya, The Philippines and South Vietnam”.Thesis. Ph.D Geography
. Syracuse University.January 1965.
P.121
[11]
Lansdale,Edward ,IN THE MIDST OF WARS: AN AMERICAN MISSION IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA(New York: Harper and Row Publishers,1972)p.53
[12]
Shalom,Stephen Rosskam, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES: A STUDY ON NEOCOLONIALISM.(Q.C.:New
Day Publishers,1986)pp.79-80
[13] Scaff, op cit p.45
[14]
According to a military pamphlet: “The
government promises an eight hectare farm, with a small nipa house in the
middle of a 600 sq.meter lot, service and food rations and other forms of
assistance in the first year of operation. A number of former Huks have obtained homestead patents to their
farm.”
[15] Armed
Forces of the Philippines, SURVEY OF PRODUCTIVITY.n.p.(1957?)
[16] ibid.p.6
[17] Ibid.
[18] ibid.p.17
[19]
ibid.
[20]
Ibid.
[21] ibid.
[22] Scaff,op
cit p.77
[23] ibid
p.66
[24] ibid.
[25] OFFICIAL
GAZETTE vol.51 no.6(June1955)p.ccl.
[26] ibid.
[27] Daily
Mirror,April 5,1956
[28] Ramon
Magsaysay died in a plane crach on March 17,1957 together with Secretary of
Education Gregorio Hernancez,former Senator Tomas Cabili, Gen. Benito Ebuen
(Chief of the Philippine Air Force),Congressmen Pedro Lopez,Manuel Zosa, and
William Chiongbian, Jean Paredes, a lawyer, and other passengers totalling
twenty-seven persons, excluding the crew. Only one person survived the
disaster. The plane Mount Pinatubo, hit the side of Mount
Manunggal due to `metal fatigue breakage’.Quirino,Carlos .MAGSAYSAY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Manila: Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Society,1964)
p.232
[29] OFFICIAL
GAZETTE vol.51 no.6 (June 1955) p.cc1
[31] OFFICIAL
GAZETTE vol.52 no.6(June 9,1956) p.dxiviii
[32]
OFFICIAL GAZETTE vol.52 no.12 (September 30,1956)p.ccccivi-vii
[33]
OFFICIAL GAZETTE vol.52 no.6
(June 9,1956)p.dxiviii]
[34] A
film was made of Kapatagan EDCOR, the “Huk sa Bagong Pamumuhay” which starred popular actress Nida Blanco and Luis
Gonzales(?) showing how miraculously the people and the place was transformed
through the EDCOR project. From a brief written by Mr. Peredo,a former EDCOR
settler, for this author’s research
[35]
MANILA TIMES November 5,1959
[36] DAILY
MIRROR December 22,1962
[37]
MANILA TIMES ,October 30,1963
[38] Quoted
by Mednick,Melvin from a Maguindanaoan
Informant in “Development Programs and the Moslems”p.38 cited in
Dow,Maynard op cit. p.127
[39]
ibid
[40] ibid.p.128
[41] MANILA
TIMES January 23,1962. Also an informant
during the author’s visit to the area, pointed to the places occupied by the
Muslims in the settlement. These were located mainly on the peripheral
mountainous area of the settlement.
[42] Dow
op.cit p.110
[43] ibid.p.113
[44] Paderanga,Jr.,C ayetano W. “A Review of Land Settlements in
the Philippines” MINDANAO STUDIES REPORT no. 2
(UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies)p.18
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